Coroners Court Findings - Workplace Fatality - Sanel Mujezinovic

admin • February 16, 2026

Sanel Mujezinovic

23 December 1980 - 17 May 2021


5 years after Sanel Mujezinovic died due to a workplace incident, the findings into his death have been released by the Victorian Coroners Court. The Coroner did not conduct an inquest, but released findings and recommendations which are published online.  


Sanel was a 40 year old man from Bundoora, where he lived with his partner Leisa. He was the father to Levi and also left behind his ex-partner Brighid. He was a concreter and was employed by Prisbel Concrete Pumping Pty Ltd, where he had worked for about 5 years.


On the day of the incident, 17 May 2021, Prisbel has been contracted by ProCon Civil Melbourne to pour concrete for a project in St Albans. Sanel was operating a concrete pumping truck - a Nissan diesel truck with a Schwing GMBH concrete boom pump. He was controlling the pouring boom at the time, while other workers were levelling the concrete. The pour began at about 7.30am and was expected to take about 5 hours. At around 11.34am, Sanel was pumping the last load and standing in the concrete slab underneath the boom, when it collapsed and struck him on the back of the head.

Despite other workers rushing to assist him, Sanel was declared deceased at the scene by the paramedics who attended.


Sanel was examined by forensic pathologists at the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine, who determined that he had suffered a skull fracture as well as a broken leg, several fractured ribs, 2 fractured vertebrae, and a collapsed lung. They determined that unconsciousness and death would have been rapid. The cause of death was determined to be: “Multiple injuries sustained in a workplace incident.”


WorkSafe Victoria investigated the incident and determined that the concrete boom had collapsed due to a metal fatigue crack in the king post (which holds the boom upright and allows the boom to slew as concrete is pumped through the boom).


An engineer gave the opinion that the cracks would have been detectable prior to the incident, but that this would require access to the king post, which would require disassembly of the unit for inspection. The concrete pump was acquired by Prisbel in 2010, at which time it was already 20 years old. The usage/ hours worked by the unit was unknown. It was inspected annually, but without disassembling the unit. At the time of purchase, it should have been subjected to a ‘major inspection’ as per the Australian Standards. This never happened and no 'major inspections' were conducted in the time that the pump was owned by Prisbel.


The Coroner determined that Prisbel was aware that there was a requirement to conduct major inspections of their concrete pumping trucks.


Prisbel engaged Andrew Baigent of Andrew Baigent Consulting Engineers to conduct inspections of the concrete pump and he issued Annual Inspection Certificates in 2019 and 2020 - although no statement by him was found to be in either the Coronial brief or the WorkSafe brief, which were provided to The Coroner.


The Coroner sought statements from Dr Baigent as his inspections were proximate to the fatal incident. His inspection did not raise any concerns relating to the king post, but it was not a major inspection so did not require the disassembly of the unit and therefore did not involve not a full inspection of the king post. The Coroner raised a number of matters as a result of the statement:

  • That the Engineer seemed to be under the impression that major inspection had been undertaken in the past, which was not what WorkSafe found in their investigation.
  • That he recommended annual inspections, rather that periodic inspections as per the 2019 standard which are based primarily on hours of operation. The coroner noted that the concrete pumps’ hour meter was malfunctioning between 2019 and 2020 and did not record operation hours.


The Coroner notes that there are differences between the 1994 and the updated 2019 Standards  (ie: Australian Standard 2550.15-2019, “Cranes, hoists and winches - Safe use - Part 15: Concrete Placing equipment”) which relate to this matter and states the following:

“Under the 2019 Standard, as already explained above, the distinction (in the 1994 Standard) between annual inspections and major inspections was removed and replaced by a single requirement for a periodic inspection conducted at least once per year (or more often depending on operating hours and the age of the equipment). In undertaking a periodic inspection, a competent person can direct for the equipment to be disassembled for thorough examination of internal components such as the king post (akin to the major inspection in the 1994 Standard), but there is no requirement for strip-down and disassembly to inspect internal components other than at the competent person’s direction.”


The Coroner observed that a problem exists in that signs of fatigue in the king post are not visible until disassembly occurs. Therefore, how would an engineer determine that there was an effectively ‘invisible’ problem which would cause them to direct a disassembly?

She stated : “my criticism is directed at the 2019 Standard itself, which may not be up to the task of uncovering issues with critical internal components such as the king post before they catastrophically fail.”


The Coroner made inquiries as to the requirements in other jurisdictions and found that it is a requirement in Queensland for a strip down 'major inspection' to be conducted every 6 years (except if deemed not necessary by a qualified engineer whose decision is based on criteria set out in a code of practice). The Coroner determined that the Queensland guidance is far superior to the Victorian 2019 standard.

She also discovered that a similar King Post failure had occurred in 2022 in Queensland, but fortunately without causing injury or death.


The Coroner stated that she was “concerned that there may be other concrete pumps in operation across Victoria with king posts in the process of cracking but not showing any outward signs of compromise. Under the current periodic inspection requirements in the 2019 Standard, these too could catastrophically fail without a competent person ever requiring them to undergo strip-down or disassembly to inspect crucial internal components.”

“I have concluded that the periodic inspection requirements described in the 2019 Standard, where a strip-down inspection is only conducted at the direction of a competent period, may not be up to the task of ensuring Victoria’s concrete pumping fleet is safe.”


It is interesting to note that these issues were raised by Senior Constable (S/C) Jonathan Tipas (who was the Coronial Investigator) and he stated the following in his report:

“The Coronial Investigator recommends a review of the current Codes of Practices and Australian Standards in relation to concrete moving equipment and a suggestion that equipment either at a certain age or hour metre be subject to yearly inspections that MUST include a full strip down and examination of internal components as previously required in the AS 2550.15-1994.”

 

However, the Coroner considered it to be ‘rather involved’ to amend the 2019 Australian Standard and therefore did not direct this action. Instead, she made a recommendation "that WorkSafe Victoria revise and update of the [Victorian] Concrete Pumping Industry Standard 2004"  and introduce "more stringent requirements for strip-down inspection of concrete pumps."

She also recommended that "WorkSafe Victoria introduce a regulatory requirement that the hour meter on concrete pumping equipment must be in good working order, and that it would be contrary to the regulatory requirement to operate the equipment where the hour meter is faulty.”

 

The Coroners findings conclude that:

“Sanel Mujezinovic died from multiple injuries sustained in a workplace incident, where he was struck by a concrete placing boom;”

and that “Sanel Mujezinovic died at his workplace, while acting in the course of his employment, in circumstances that may have been prevented had a strip-down inspection occurred.”


Prisbel had previously been prosecuted and pleaded guilty to a single charge of “failing to provide a safe work environment” under sections 21(1) and (2)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004.

The penalty handed down by the Magistrates Court in 2025 was $50,000 with conviction.


Please find the full report at:

COR 2021 002573 Form 38 - Finding into Death without Inquest.pdf (source)


We pay our respects to those who have lost their lives at work and acknowledge the pain and suffering of those left behind.

Everyone has the right to come home from work alive and well at the end of the day.

By admin • November 17, 2026
On 19 November 2010, 29 miners went to work and never came home. At 3:44 pm, a methane explosion occurred at the Pike River Coal Mine on the West Coast of New Zealand's South Island. 31 workers were underground at the time. Daniel Rockhouse survived the initial explosion and managed to rescue both himself and his colleague, Russell Smith. They were the only two survivors. Over the following days, a series of further explosions destroyed any remaining hope of finding the missing miners alive. 29 men lost their lives, and their bodies have never been recovered. A Royal Commission of Inquiry was established to investigate the disaster, and explored causation, rescue efforts, relevant laws and the regulator’s implementation of the legislation. The Cause of the Explosion and Loss of Life Methane is naturally present within coal seams and is released during mining operations. The Royal Commission found that methane accumulated within the mine and came into contact with an ignition source, such as a spark, hot engine component, or electrical arc. The explosion resulted from a failure to adequately control methane levels in the mine on or before 19 November 2010. The exact location of the workers at the time of the explosion remains unknown. Investigators concluded that the men may have been killed by the blast itself, the powerful pressure wave generated by the explosion, or by the rapid depletion of oxygen in the mine atmosphere. However, the precise cause of death for individual miners has not been determined. Why the Pike River Tragedy Occurred The Royal Commission identified numerous contributing factors. The disaster occurred during an intense drive to achieve coal production targets in a mine plagued by leadership failures, operational shortcomings, and a poor safety culture. 1 The Commission concluded that production pressures often took precedence over safety considerations. It also identified inadequate oversight by the health and safety regulator, as well as significant weaknesses in New Zealand's mining legislation and regulatory framework. The rescue effort was impacted by a lack of advance planning and the failure to implement New Zealand's Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS). Communication with families during the emergency response was also found to be inadequate. Technical failures within the mine were extensive and included deficiencies in Ventilation systems, Methane drainage and venting arrangements, Methane monitoring sensors and Electrical safety systems. Additional contributing factors included the use of hydro-mining techniques, production-based incentives, and repeated methane spikes that were not effectively investigated or controlled in the lead up to the explosion. The Effectiveness of the Search, Rescue and Recovery Operation The first indication of a problem was the loss of radio communication with workers underground. An electrician was subsequently sent into the mine to investigate. He travelled approximately 1,500 metres underground before being forced to retreat due to the toxic atmosphere. Before withdrawing, he observed what appeared to be a person lying beside a vehicle. He reported his observations at approximately 4:25 pm. Emergency services were not contacted until after this report was received, resulting in a significant delay in the initial response. Police assumed overall control of the emergency operation, although numerous organisations were involved, including Pike River management, Mines Rescue teams, the New Zealand Fire Service, the Department of Labour, St John Ambulance, and other supporting agencies. The Royal Commission found that key principles of the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) were not consistently followed. As a result, critical decision-making processes were slower than they should have been during a time when the timeliness of decision-making was critical. Conditions within the mine remained unstable and largely unknown. Damage to the mine's ventilation system significantly increased the risks associated with any rescue attempt. The response was also hindered by a lack of reliable information regarding underground conditions. Without accurate atmospheric data, rescuers could not safely enter the mine. When a second explosion occurred on the morning of 24 November 2010, any realistic hope of rescuing survivors was lost. The mine was subsequently sealed and flooded with inert gas to prevent fires and reduce the risk of further explosions. In 2012, the mine was purchased by Solid Energy New Zealand Ltd, with an agreement to recover the bodies (if mining resumes) if it ‘can be achieved safely, is technically feasible and is financially credible’. Despite ongoing public interest and advocacy from families, no full recovery of the miners' remains has occurred. The Adequacy of New Zealand Mining Laws and Their Implementation The Royal Commission identified significant shortcomings in New Zealand's mining regulatory framework and the way it was administered. The Commission found that regulators had adopted an overly passive approach, operating on the assumption that employers would implement best practice without sufficient oversight. This resulted in limited compliance activity and inadequate enforcement action. The inquiry also identified failures in the resourcing and support provided to the mining inspectorate. At the time of the disaster, New Zealand had only two mining inspectors responsible for overseeing the entire mining industry. The Commission concluded that they were unable to effectively carry out their statutory functions. Broader failures were also identified within the government's approach to occupational health and safety strategy, transparency, and regulatory leadership. The Commission emphasised the need for a modern compliance strategy: "Enforcement under a modern compliance strategy requires a risk-based selection of employers for audit and inspection, intelligence gathering, audit and inspection methodologies, work measurement and a graduated use of enforcement tools."² The Commission went so far as to recommend consideration of a new regulator, citing ‘its lack of national leadership, the need for approved codes of practice to guide employers and insufficient focus and expertise regarding health and safety at senior management levels.’ 2 It described some models where a regulator focusing solely on health and safety and with appropriate accountability could be established. How New Zealand Mining Laws Compared to Other Jurisdictions The Royal Commission found that New Zealand's mining legislation and regulations required urgent review and reform. Among its observations was that workers “should be entitled to receive key information on health and safety risks without having to ask for it”. The Commission also recognised the important role of Health and Safety Representatives (HSRs) and union representatives, recommending that they be appropriately trained and empowered to carry out inspections and direct workers to cease unsafe work where there is an immediate danger. The inquiry further identified a need for company directors to have clearly defined statutory responsibilities, similar to those imposed on employers and managers. Ultimately, the Commission concluded that the Pike River disaster was preventable and that comprehensive reform was necessary to prevent similar tragedies in the future. Recommended reforms included: Stronger permit and approval processes linked to health and safety performance Significant improvements to the regulator Fundamental changes to mining regulations Enhanced emergency preparedness and response arrangements Greater worker participation in health and safety Increased accountability for directors The Commission's Recommendations The Royal Commission made 16 recommendations aimed at improving mine safety and strengthening New Zealand's regulatory framework.³ Many of these recommendations influenced subsequent changes to New Zealand's health and safety laws and contributed to the establishment of WorkSafe New Zealand in 2013. Justice, Accountability and Ongoing Investigations Families of the victims, unions, and community advocates have continued to campaign for accountability, justice, and the recovery of the miners' remains. Pike River Coal Ltd and VLI Drilling were convicted of health and safety offences arising from the disaster. In 2013, Pike River Coal Chief Executive Peter Whittall was charged by WorkSafe New Zealand. However, the prosecution was later abandoned after a $3.41 million payment was made to the families of the victims and the two surviving miners. According to media reports: "The money was split between the two survivors and the families of the 29 missing, a total of $110,000 for each man who had been down the mine that day."⁴ The legality of this arrangement was subsequently challenged, and the New Zealand Supreme Court later determined that the deal was unlawful. More than a decade after the disaster, no bodies have been recovered from the mine, and police investigations into the tragedy continue. Remembering the Men Lost at Pike River As always, the primary concern in any workplace disaster must be the individuals who have lost their lives and the enduring impact on their families. They should have come home. The men who lost their lives in the Pike River disaster were: Conrad Adams Daniel Herk David Hoggart Richard Holling Koos Jonker Peter Rodger Blair Sims Keith Valli Terry Kitchin Joshua Ufer Zen Drew Kane Nieper Kiki Keane Malcolm Campbell Glenn Cruse Allan Dixon Christopher Duggan William Joynson Stuart Mudge Peter O'Neill Brendon Palmer Samuel Mackie Milton Osborne Joseph Dunbar Benjamin Rockhouse Michael Monk John Hale Andrew Hurren Francis Marden 1. Volume One - What Happened at Pike River - pikeriver.royalcommission.govt.nz 2. Volume One - Proposals for Reform - pikeriver.royalcommission.govt.nz 3. Volume One - Recommendations - pikeriver.royalcommission.govt.nz 4. Pike River mine disaster: Police work with Crown Solicitor over decision to lay charges 5. Volume One - Contents - pikeriver.royalcommission.govt.nz
By admin • November 9, 2026
BeSafe recently had the privilege of attending the unveiling of the Memorial Quilt at Melbourne Trades Hall; a deeply moving tribute to those who have lost their lives at work. Handcrafted by grieving families, the quilt features 45 individual squares. Each square was carefully sewn by hand to honour a loved one who never came home due to a preventable workplace fatality. Behind every stitch is a personal story, a family forever changed, and a stark reminder that workplace health and safety is about far more than compliance and checklists: it is about protecting human lives. The unveiling ceremony featured powerful addresses from four speakers who shared their personal experiences and insights into the ongoing impact of workplace tragedy. Attendees heard fr o m Bette Phillips-Campbell , the founder of GriefWork, alongside Victorian Trades Hall Council Assistant Secretary Wil Stracke , Workplace Safety Advocate Dr Lana Cormie , and Alannah McGregor, founder of the Suicide Prevention and Awareness Network (SPAN), who spoke courageously about the devastating loss of her children. Their words underscor ed the vital need for both preventative safety measures and ongoing support for families left behind. The Memorial Quilt project originally began through the Uniting Church’s Work-Related Grief Support Program. This vital program was one of the earliest initiatives of what is now known as GriefWork, currently the only specialist bereavement support service in Australia dedicated exclusively to families affected by work-related fatalities. Before finding its home at Melbourne Trades Hall, the quilt travelled across Australia to raise public awareness about workplace injuries and deaths, sparking important conversations about safety. Today, the Memorial Quilt hangs proudly in the Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) training room at Melbourne Trades Hall. Its' placement could not be more fitting. Every time workers, health and safety representatives, and trainees attend this room, the quilt will stand as a powerful visual reminder of why safe workplaces matter, and the true human cost when workplace safety falls short. At BeSafe, we remain committed to helping Victorians build safer working environments so that every worker returns home safely at the end of the day. Read more: https://www.ohsrep.org.au/memorial_quilt_unveiling_sn_828 https://www.unitingvictas.org.au/services/mental-health/griefwork/